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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20040257-CA
vs.
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance

of counsel at trial? A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact.
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, ''ineffective assistance of
counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal
question of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App.
1995).
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error."

1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d
473, 477 (Utah App. 1989).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Orrin Bruce Wallace appeals from the March 12, 2004, judgment, sentence and

commitment of the Fifth District Court after a conviction of assault by a prisoner, a third
degree felony.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Orrin Bruce Wallace was charged by information filed in the Fifth District Court

on or about May 23, 2004, with assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102.5 (R. 1).
At the preliminary hearing on June 9, 2003, the trial court found probable cause
to bind Wallace over for trial (R. 14-15, 132 at 13). On June 16, 2003, Wallace entered
a plea of not guilty (R. 17).
On September 30, 2003, Wallace was convicted of assault by a prisoner by Judge
Beacham (R. 35-36, 135). On the same date as the trial, Wallace, pro se, filed a motion
alleging that he was being selectively prosecuted (R. 37-58). Wallace had informed his
2

counsel of this issue but she refused to address it and informed the trial court at the
beginning of trial that it "is something he is doing on his own, it's not connected with
my representation" (R. 135 at 4). Trial counsel also informed the trial court that she had
advised Wallace that his motion should be presented, if necessary, at the "end of the
case" (Id.).
On October 6, 2003, Wallace, pro se, filed-in substance-the same motion
alleging selective prosecution (R. 63A-63G). Wallace also requested an evidentiary
hearing on the matter (R. 62). A oopy of these documents is included in the Addenda.
On November 13, 2003, Wallace was sent to the Utah State Prison for a 60-day
diagnostic evaluation (R. 69-71). On March 4, 2004, Gutierrez was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 87-89).
On March 19, 2004, Wallace, pro se, filed a notice of appeal in Fifth District
Court (R. 91)

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On May 15, 2003, Orrin Wallace and David Zserai got into a verbal altercation at
the Purgatory Correctional Facility in Washington County, Utah (R. 135 at 6). Wallace
had been playing handball in the mini-yard while Zserai was sitting down against the
wall watching (R. 135 at 12). During the game there was a discrepancy in a call and
Zserai voiced his opinion (R. 135 at 12-13). According to Zserai, Wallace got angry,
started yelling, and then ran over to him and hit him with his fist one time on the left
side of his face (R. 135 at 13, 22). Zserai testified that the inside of his cheek was cut
and he had some scratches (R. 135 at 13, 14). Zserai denied hitting Wallace but testified
that he "might have pushed him or something" (R. 135 at 15). Prior to this incident the
3

two were friends and after the incident they really had no interaction as they both spent
time in lock-down (R. 135 at 16).
Wallace testified that while he was playing handball, observers-including Zserai,
were interrupting play by "making false calls" (R. 135 at 58). Wallace stated that he
heard Zserai call him a "stupid black mother-f..er" (R. 135 at 59). Wallace walked
towards Zserai and asked him who he was calling out (Id.). According to Wallace,
Zserai responded "you, you stupid f-k"(Id.). Wallace then "lost if and smacked Zserai
with an open hand (Id.). According to Wallace, Zserai then got up and slapped him (R.
135 at 61).
Zserai had a small cut on his upper inside lip that did not require stitches or
further treatment (R. 135 at 7, 9)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wallace asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent trial
counsel. The record clearly shows that Wallace's trial counsel, Brenda Whiteley, knew
that Wallace was concerned about the prosecutor's alleged bias against Wallace and the
selective prosecution based on his race (R. 135 at 3-4). However, Whiteley was
unwilling to pursue the motion or even insure that the motion was timely filed and heard
by the trial court. In fact, she specifically told the trial court that Wallace had to proceed
with the motion "on his own" because she did not want to be "connected" with the
motion; and that she did not believe the motion needed to be raised or addressed prior to
trial (R. 135 at 3-4). Wallace's affidavit shows that his claim is meritorious in that he
has at least carried his burden to establish selective prosecution. Therefore, Wallace
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was prejudiced by Whiteley's deficient performance because had his motion been timely
filed and pursued, an evidentiary hearing likely would have been held.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WALLACE'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN
FAILING TO TIMELY FILE OR PURSUE HIS MOTION
REGARDING SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
Wallace asserts that he was selectively prosecuted because of his being an
African American and the prosecutor's personal vendetta against him, thereby violating
his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and his rights to the uniform operation of laws under Article I, Section 24
of the Utah Constitution. Wallace further asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to timely file his
motion of selective prosecution. Accordingly, Wallace's conviction should be reversed
and remanded and an evidentiary hearing held to determine this issue.
"Prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining whether to prosecute. As
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed,
the decision regarding whether to prosecute 'generally rests entirely in [the
prosecutor's] discretion.'" State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1988) (citing
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)). However,
"the decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" Id. (citing Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)). In order to establish
a prima facie case for selective prosecution, thus shifting the burden to the State, "the
5

defendant must demonstrate that a prosecutorial policy results in a discriminatory effect,
based on an unlawful classification." Id. (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at
1531). Or, the defendant must make an "initial showing" that "(1) he was singled out
for prosecution while others similarly situated were not generally prosecuted; and (2) the
prosecution was invidiously based on racial, religious, or other impermissible
considerations." United States v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 161 (10th Cir. App. 1986).
In State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1988), Geer was convicted of bigamy. Id.
at 2. Before trial, Geer filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the State selectively
prosecutes only those bigamists who practice bigamy for other than religious reasons.
Id. at 3. To support this claim, Geer offered an affidavit of Robert Adkins, the county
attorney, which stated that he had never been requested by law enforcement officers or
others to file bigamy charges, except against Greer. Id. However, the affidavit also
stated that at the time the charges were filed, Adkins did not know whether Geer's
bigamy practice was based on religious convictions or for other reasons and that he
would prosecute persons under the bigamy statute regardless of religious convictions.
Id. Adkins further stated his decision to prosecute was based solely on whether there
was sufficient evidence to convict. Id.
This Court held that Geer failed to establish that he was being treated differently
than any other bigamist or that the State had a discriminatory policy against nonreligious bigamists. Geer, 765 P.2d at 4. Because Geer failed to meet his burden of
proof, the trial court properly denied his motion. Id.
In United States v. Bryant, 5 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1993), Bryant requested an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was being selectively prosecuted on the
basis of his race. Id. at 475. Bryant, along with one hundred other individuals, was
6

arrested for distributing drugs to an undercover police officer. Bryant, an African
American, along with nine other African Americans, were prosecuted in Federal Court
whereas all others were prosecuted in State Court. Id; see also United States v. Bryant,
No. 91-CR-27W (D. Utah April 30, 1992) (order denying request for evidentiary
hearing). Defendant filed a motion of selective prosecution contending he was being
singled out because of his race, but he failed to file an affidavit to substantiate the
charges of selective prosecution based on race. Id. The trial court denied the motion and
Bryant was convicted. Id. On appeal, The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided not to
reach the merits of Bryant's claims on the basis that the motion was filed after trial and
therefore the claim was waived. Id.
In the present case, Wallace admitted at trial that he slapped Mr. Zserai while
playing handball in the prison court (R. 135 at 59-60). Wallace contends, however, that
he personally knows of other inmates that have been charged for fighting and other
threatening conduct that received lesser charges or plea agreements for their conduct (R.
37-38, 60-61, 62-63). Instead of receiving a reduced penalty like other inmates similarly
situated, Wallace was charged to the full extent of the law, assault by a prisoner, a third
degree felony (R. 1). Unlike Geer and Bryant, wherein the defendants failed to present
sufficient evidence of selective prosecution based on religion or race, Wallace did file
an affidavit with the trial court supporting his claims of selective prosecution based on
race (R. 37-38, 62-63). The affidavit asserts that white inmates had the opportunity to
plea bargain in order to receive a lesser charge and penalty (R. 63-G). Wallace
specifically refers to an incident where Chad White, a white man, crushed another
inmate's sinus and was given a Class B misdemeanor (R. 63-A). Wallace also refers to
another incident wherein Fred Mitchell, a Native American, was involved in an
7

altercation with another inmate and charged with Assault By a Prisoner, but was allowed
to plea down to a lesser degree (R. 63-A, B). Wallace, an African American, was not
afforded the same leniencies. The prosecutor never offered Wallace a plea bargain
which he asserts he would have readily accepted (R. 63-B). Therefore, Wallace has
carried his burden of proof and has established at least a prima facie case that he was
selectively prosecuted on the basis of his race in violation of his rights.
However, due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness, Wallace's first affidavit for entry
of selective prosecution was filed on the date of trial, September 30, 2003, and the
motion for evidentiary hearing was filed after trial (R. 37-38, 62-63). The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
require motions based on selective prosecution must be filed prior to trial. Bryant, 5 F.3d
at 476. Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is similar to the federal rules,
and in the event that this Court deems Wallace's motion untimely, he asserts that he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel for filing the motion
late.
Utah has adopted the two-part test for determining when a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated: "To prevail, a
defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994); see Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The record clearly shows that Wallace's trial counsel, Brenda Whiteley, knew
that Wallace was concerned about the prosecutor's alleged bias against Wallace and the
8

selective prosecution based on his race (R. 135 at 3-4). However, Whiteley was
unwilling to file the motion before trial and specifically told the trial court that Wallace
had to proceed with the motion u on his own" because she did not want to be
"connected" with the motion (R. 135 at 4). Despite the fact that Wallace retained
Whiteley and paid her with his own money, she refused to respect his decisions on how
to proceed with the motion (R. 25). Wallace's affidavit shows that his claim is
meritorious in that he has at least carried his burden to establish selective prosecution.
Therefore, an evidentiary hearing likely would have been held had Whiteley timely filed
and pursued the motion.
By refusing to proceed with Wallace's wishes, Whiteley failed to follow Rule
1.2(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. This rule provides that "a lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation" subject to
any legal restraints. Moreover, Whiteley's representation fell below an objective
standard because Wallace's meritorious assertions required an evidentiary hearing upon
filing of the motion. Had the motion been timely filed, an evidentiary hearing would
have been granted, Wallace would have been entitled to discoverable documents to
support his claim, and it is likely the trial court would have found in his favor. It is also
likely that had the evidentiary hearing been granted, the prosecution would have offered
Wallace a plea. Thus, had Whiteley timely filed the motion, it is likely that Wallace
would have received a more favorable outcome. Accordingly, Wallace was denied his
right to effective assistance of counsel and his conviction should be reversed and an
evidentiary hearing granted to resolve this issue.

9

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Wallace asks that this Court reverse his conviction for
assault by a prisoner and reverse this matter to the Fifth District Court for an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of selective prosecution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of November, 2004.

MargaretT. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 1st day of November,
2004.
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Orrin Bruce Wallace # 75977
Puratory Correctional Facility
750 S. 5400 W.
HURRICANE, UTAH 84737

>•- ,
'

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
WASHINTGON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE
Defendant.

Criminal No. 031500641

AFFIDAVIT FOR ENTRY OF
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

STATE OFUTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

SS: AFFIDAVIT OF
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE

Comes Now the defendant in the abovestyle case pro se ORRIN
BRUCE WALLACE, AND AFTER BEING DULY SWORN, deposes and
says:
1) That he is representing himself in this matter by and through counsel.
2) That the Plaintiff the State of Utah is Selectively Prosecuting this case.
3) Other inmates similarly situated have had the opportunity to plead to a lesser degree in

the cateory of assault.
4) That I Orrin Bruce Wallace have not been afforded that same opportunity as the
majority of my peers who happen to be of other races besides AFRICAN AMERICAN.
5) That this "Discrimintory Treatment" deprives me of Equal Protect of the Law
Guananteed of the United Staes Constitution.
6) Therefore the Selective Prosecution of the case at bar is improperly motivated due to
the fact that it is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race.
7) The defendant Orrin Bruce Wallace is entitled by law to have a Fair Prosecution
without theTaint of Suspicion. Clear and Free of Racial Discrimination.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for an order as follows:
1) Declaring the defendant be afforded - to the reduction of a lesser degree of penalty,
i.e. a misdemeanor.
2) Declaring that this prosecution is Selective, Vindictive- and Fundamentally unfair.
3) Grant unto Defendant such other and further relief as this court may deem just and
proper.
AFFIDAVIT FURTHER SAYTH NAUGHT
Done this date:

„^
J
<pr^BruceJwallace

BY
Sworn to Under Penalty of Perjury

COPIES FURNISHED TO: CLERK OF COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY
PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN
BRENDA S. WHITELY

(J^H^

Orrin Bruce Wallace # 75977
Puratory Correctional Facility
750 S. 5400 W.
HURRICANE, UTAH 84737
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
WASHINTGON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE
Defendant.

Criminal No. 031500641

Memorandum of Law
The States selective prosecution and or vindictiveness is not per se an isolated incident,
and the evidence will show that Mr.Paul Christensen has committed various violations in
an attempt to put Mr. Orrin Bruce Wallace away by any means possible even if he has to
violate Constitutional Rights to do so.

1) It has been the standard of practice for the State to settle Assault by Prisoner cases, the
American Judicial system encourages settlement any and all law students are taught right
off the bat that even from English Common Law settlement has always been inspired. So
why not settle in this case?
2) There have been far more severe cases in where the state has settled.
3) Just recently a case was settled of a defendant [Chad White] a state inmate who had
cave another inmates sinus in, this inmate [Chad White] was given a Class B misdemenor
also credited for the time served in Punitive Isolation. This case was setted without going
to trial.
4) [Chad White] who is also {white} was also charged with 76-5-102.5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended. Fred Mitchell who is also {Indian} another state inmate
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that was charged with Assault By a Prisoner also got the chance to plead to a lesser
degree.
5) This case evolves around Racial insult, and for that matter it would be deemed that the
Prosecutor in this case refuses to negotiate a settlement.
6) In the instant case a open hand slap was used in which the other inmate also retaliated
with a open hand slap.
7) Defendant would have settled in the above case given the opportunity, but the
Prosecutor in the case refused to do so.
8) There is history along with animosity between the defenant Orrin Bruce Wallace and
the prosecutor Mr. Paul R.Christensen dating back to August 2001.
9) This history stimulates from the the defendant exercising his constitutional rights to
defend himself at times pro se and other times co- counsel; over the last two years.
"There is no vindictiveness as long as the prosecutor's decision is based upon the normal
factors ordinarily considered in determining what course to pursue, rather than upon
genuine animus against the defendant for an improper reason or in retaliation for exercise
of legal or constitutional rights." . . . Our inquiry must be whether, "as a practical matter,
there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have
occurred but for hostility or punitive animus towards the defendant because he exercised
his specific legal right."
Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1042 (quoting United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th
Cir. 1982)). We explained how the test was to be applied:
A defendant has the burden of proof and must establish either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness.
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable,
objective reasons.
See; 965 F.2d 848::United States v. P.H.E., Inc.::May 26, 1992
This approach has been employed by other courts as well. See, e.g., United States v.
Adams, 870 F.2d 1140,1146 (6th Cir. 1989) (where criminal defendant presents evidence
of vindictive prosecution, defendant is entitled to evidentiary hearing and discovery to
permit her to develop defense). The pragmatic and common-sense nature of the analysis
also has been recognized. See Council for Periodical Distr. Ass'n v. Evans, 642 F. Supp.
552, 556 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (criminal prosecution enjoined if plaintiff shows conduct was
constitutionally protected and improper purpose was "a major motivating factor and
played a prominent role in the decision to prosecute"), affd in relevant part, 827 F.2d
1483 (11th Cir. 1987).

We conclude that appellants have already satisfied their burden of showing that the
indictment is the tainted fruit of a prosecutorial attempt to curtail PHE's future First

Amendment protected speech. Analogizing from the teachings Raymer, we are satisfied
that they have met their burden of showing "either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of
vindictiveness." 941 F.2d at 1040. On remand the burden now shifts to the government
"to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable, objective reasons." Id. In considering
whether such proper reasons exist, the polestar to guide the district court on remand will
be the controlling precept it recognized in its previous opinion in this case:
The inquiry is whether, "'as a practical matter, there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood
of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for the hostility or punitive
animus towards the defendant because he exercised his specific legal rights.'"
Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 (quoting Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1042 (quoting United States v. GallegosCuriel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 1982))) (emphasis supplied).

10) In this case specifically the defendant uses his legal right to represent himself when in
some instances counsel neglects to do so. The mediocrity of some counsel that has
represented the defendant in the pass two years has simply been distasteful were the
defendant sometimes feels (that in order to get something right he must relie upon
himself) this comes from the defendant being self reliance in rememberance from his
favorite Author " Ralph Waldo Emmerson".

11) Defendant alleges that his respective rights to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights to the uniform operation of
laws under article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution are in violation. As a result, he
argues, that he being deprived of due process of law under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution. 821 P.2d 457::Herman v. State:.'November 26, 1991.
12) Defendant contends, however, that others within the class of persons who have been
charged of these crimes have been afforded the opportunity of reduction of the offense to
a lower cateory. And some offenders have not been charged at all.
13) Defendant also asserts that there is an intentional and deliberate plan on the part of
state officilas to enforce the law selectively against him. Due the fact that the DA in this
case has a personal vindecta aganist him. What might that plan be? (1) The states plan is
to convict the defendant of a felony at all cost. (2) Prior to the filing of these charges the
State officials had two other cases pending in which the chances of obtaining a felony
conviction were very slim at best; one case is filled with perjured testimoney; and the
other case state oficials know or should know that the defendant is innocent as charged.
(3) With the filing of the third case in which the state officials know they had the
defendant [dead bang] they proceeded to use the latter case to coerce defendant in to
pleading guilty to a package deal.(4) When prosecuting attorney found out that the
defendant would not go for this package deal they refuse to negoiate settlement at all.

14) Defendant also asserts that he is being "selectively prosecuted" because of his being
an African American. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21896::UNITED STATES v.
BRYANT::April 29,1992, Decided
15) "There is a presumption that prosecution for violation of the criminal law is in good
faith." United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1980). "To demonstrate
unconstitutionally selective prosecution a defendant must show (1) he was singled out for
prosecution while others similarly situated were not generally prosecuted; and (2) the
prosecution was invidiously based on racial, religious, or other impermissible
considerations." United States v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159,161 (10th Cir. 1986).
Furthermore, where there has been no factual showing that the statute has not been
enforced evenhandedly, the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.
United States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862, 869 (10th Cir. 1981).
Safeguarding the rights of the accused has been viewed, at least by some justices as a
critical aspect of protecting the rights of minorities. Justice Frankfurter, for example,
decribed accused persons as themselves constituting a highly unpopular minority (noting
that "those accused of crime *** have few friends" )and argued that the judiciary
therefore had a special obligation to provide " alert and strenuous resistanced " to
infringements of criminal procedural safeguards. Harris V. U.S.,331 U.S. 145, 67 S.CT.
1098, 91 L.ED. 1399(1947), 28, 87, 104, 105. Commentators have suggested that the fact
that accused persons so frequently are members of disavantaged groups also has
contributed to the courts heightened concern that the criminal justice process be fairly
administered. It is certainly true that the court has taken signifiant steps to elimnate the
traditional disavantages that precluded the the indigent defendant from fully exercising
his procedural ritghs (see 7.1) So too the court has noted on several occasions that, to
preserve the integrity of the criminal justice process, Constitutional safegauds must
preclude any suggestion of racial discrimination in its administration. See Rose v.
Mitchell (8.3(b); Batson V.Ky.8.6(b).(guoted from Criminal Procedure Constitutional
Limitations in a Nut Shell) pg 27-28 1.3(a) Criminal process as a civil liberty.
[Jerold H.Israel, and Wayne R. Lafave.]

Is it permissible to single out a individual because of the color of his skin ?
Or because a defendant exercises his legal right to defend himself in a County or State for
that matter in which he is a minorty ?
Is it ethical for the state to go through any length to secure a conviction even if they have
to breake the great laws of this Nation?
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Prosecutor does not represent an entity whose interest include winning at all cost:
prosecutor's client is society< which seeks justice not Victory U.S. V. Doe, 860 F2d 488
(lstCir.1988)
Is it okay for white counter parts to breake each others jaws, breake each others noeses
,cave in each others sinuses and recieve a lesser degree penalty in the process; than that
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of a Black individual whos crime is not nearly as severe?
But if a Black man so much as raise his hand toward a white man even after being
provoked; it is manatory that he recieve a 3rd degree Felony with no chance to plea to a
lesser degree unless defendant pleas guilty to another felony in a seperate case!
Louis D. Brandeis- U.S. Supreme Court- 1856-1941: once stated
,f
To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the ends justifies the means - to
declare that the Goverment may commit crimes in order to secure conviction of a private
criminal - would bring terrible retrbution."
The Equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is in place to safeguard me
from these illegalites.
Robert M. LaFollette, Sr, -American Polititical & Reform Leader- 1925:
" let no man think that we can deny civil liberty to others and retain it for
ourselves
When zealous agents of the Goverment arrest suspected 'radicals' without
warrant, hold them without prompt trial, deny them access to counsel and admission of
b a i l . . . we have shorn the Bill of Rights of its sanctity as a shield to every American
citizen."

Done this date
allace
BY

Sworn to Under Penalty of Perjury

COPIES FURNISHED TO: CLERK OF COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY
PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN
BRENDA S. WHITELY

Orrin Bruce Wallace # 75977
Puratory Correctional Facility
750 S. 5400 W.
HURRICANE, UTAH 84737

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
WASHINTGON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
VS.

ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE
Defendant.

Criminal No. 031500641

Motion For Evidentary Hearing
COMES NOW, Defendant Orrin B. Wallace, pro se and respectfully request this court to grant a
Evidentary Hearing on the issue of SELECTIVE PROSECUTION in the abovestyled case that was
tried on September 30, 2003. The grounds for this motion are:

1) Defendant alleges that his respective rights to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights to the uniform operation of laws under article I,
section 24 of the Utah Constitution are in violation. As a result, he argues, that he being deprived of due
process of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 821 P.2d 457::Herman v. State: .-November 26, 1991.
2) Defendant contends, however, that others within the class of persons who have been charged of
these crimes have been afforded the opportunity of reduction of the offense to a lower cateory. And some
offenders have not been charged at all.
3) Defendant also asserts that there is an intentional and deliberate plan on the part of state
officilas to enforce the law selectively against him. Due the fact that the DA in this case has a personal
vindecta aganist him.
4) Defendant also asserts that he is being "selectively prosecuted" because of his being an African
American. In violation of the "EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION "the Fourteenth Amendment.

Also see AFFIDAVIT FOR SELECTIVE PROSECUTION.

Dated this day_

IdsoCf*?^

NOTARY
750 South 5400 West
Hurricane, UT 84737
COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Clerk of the Court, Washington County
Paul R. Chirstensen States Attorny
Brenda S. Whitely Esq.

NOTARY PUBLIC
CHASE T. ENCE
750 SOUTH 5400 WEST
HURRICANE, UT 84737
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
AUGUST 22,2007
STATE OF UTAH

